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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940045-CA 
v. : 
DEBRA A. HODGES, : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions of burglary of a 
dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1990), and theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1) (d) (1990), in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable David S. Young, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did defendant properly preserve for appeal an 
objection to the testimony of witness Teresa Christensen 
regarding threatening statements made to her by defendant? 
An appellate court may not consider issues raised for 
the first time on appeal, absent a showing of plain error. State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 
1024, 110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990); State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 
(Utah 1982); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 
1992). 
2. Did the trial court properly allow the State to 
present evidence of defendant's threatening statement to witness 
Kenneth White made between the date of the offense and the trial 
under rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of Evidence? 
A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence 
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is reviewed under a 
standard of "abuse of discretion" or "reasonability." State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). See also State v. 
Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5-6 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991); State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295-
96 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah 
App. 1989) . 
3. Did the trial court properly allow the State to 
call a witness not named in a pretrial discovery witness list, 
but whose name and role in the case had been disclosed to the 
defense in advance of trial? 
In granting or denying discovery requests, "a trial 
court is allowed broad discretion" and "its determinations on 
this subject will not be overturned on appeal unless the court 
has abused its discretion." State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026, 1927 
(Utah 1982). See also State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah 
2 
1984). But see State v. Tennvson, 850 P.2d 461, 472 (Utah App. 
1993) (trial court's determination of what materials fall within 
the scope of the discovery statute is a conclusion of law which 
is reviewed for correctness). 
In reviewing the remedy chosen by a trial court to 
address a breach of the discovery rules, the standard is one of 
abuse of discretion. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah 
1987); accord State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1243 (Utah), 
cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 476 (1993); State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 
415, 418 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and 
rules are set forth in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1990) 
Utah R. Evid. 4 02 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Utah R. Evid. 4 04 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with burglary, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), and 
theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (1990) (R. 7-8). A jury found defendant guilty of both 
charges (R. 101-02, 318-19). On December 20, 1993, defendant was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term of one to fifteen 
years, in addition to fines, fees, and restitution (R. 107-08, 
336). Defendant now appeals her conviction. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of June 3, 1993, Edward 
"Pete" Johnson's apartment was burglarized. Johnson awoke to see 
a person with a covered head standing next to his bed (R. 152). 
He arose from bed and struggled with the intruder. The struggle 
moved out of the bedroom and eventually out of the apartment into 
the hallway of the apartment complex (R. 153). Johnson was able 
to remove a plastic garbage sack from the intruder's head, and 
found that the person was also wearing a nylon stocking or 
stocking cap (R. 153-54, 176). He could only partially remove 
the second covering before the intruder escaped (R. 176). 
Johnson thought that the intruder was defendant, who also lived 
in the building and had cleaned Johnson's apartment on prior 
occasions, although he was not certain of the identification (R. 
151, 156-57) . 
Kenneth White, who lived in the apartment next door, 
was awakened and came out to investigate. After calling the 
police, White witnessed the end of the struggle between Johnson 
and the intruder (173-75). Although White did not get a good 
look at the person's face, he identified defendant, an 
acquaintance, as the intruder by her voice, her pear-shaped body, 
and the black sweater with a flower design that she was wearing 
(R. 176-79). 
A day or two after the burglary, defendant confessed to 
Teresa Christensen, an acquaintance who also lived in the 
building, that she had committed the burglary of Johnson's 
4 
apartment and had stolen his wallet and money (R. 200-02) .1 
Ruth Ann Smith, another tenant of the same building, testified 
that she accompanied defendant to Johnson's apartment on the 
night of the burglary, remained outside, and witnessed defendant 
enter the apartment with a key; Smith fled when the commotion 
began (R. 251-54). 
White testified at defendant's trial that about five 
days after the burglary he had received threatening phone calls 
from defendant, wherein she told him, "You're dead, you're dead" 
(R. 180, 186). Christensen testified that defendant contacted 
her at a bar a week or two after the burglary and told her she 
would be killed if she testified (R. 203-04). Smith likewise 
testified of being encouraged by defendant to not testify 
truthfully, although she was not threatened (R. 256-57) . 
Defense counsel's request for discovery asked for "[a] 
list of all the witnesses that the State intends to call for 
trial in the above-entitled matter, their addresses, telephone 
numbers and criminal records" (R. 18). The State provided such a 
list naming all witnesses eventually called at trial except for 
Ruth Ann Smith (R. 7-8, 136-40, 239-40, Br. of App. at 3). 
However, Smith's name and a description of her involvement in the 
case were contained in a police report provided to defense 
counsel well in advance of trial (R. 238-40) . 
1
 Johnson's wallet and its contents, including twenty dollars 
in cash, had been in a pants pocket next to his bed (R. 158). 
5 
On the morning of trial, Smith appeared and volunteered 
to testify (R. 136, 240). Defense counsel was immediately 
notified of Smith's appearance (R. 240). Because two other 
witnesses had failed to appear, the State requested the court to 
allow it to call Smith as a witness (R. 136-39). The court 
denied the State's motion, based on a belief that the police 
report given to defense counsel had contained only Smith's first 
name (R. 143). Later on during the first day of trial, the court 
discovered that Smith's full name, as well as a description of 
her role as a "lookout" in the burglary, were set forth in the 
police report given to counsel (R. 228, 238-40). Based on that 
new information and based on its finding that Smith's testimony 
would be relevant to rebut defense counsel's cross-examination of 
another witness, the court reversed its earlier ruling and 
allowed Smith to testify (R. 233-35, 239). The trial was 
continued into a second day, in part to allow defense counsel 
time to speak with Smith and to gather information about Smith's 
criminal history (R. 243-45). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should not consider defendant's claim that 
the testimony of witness Teresa Christensen regarding defendant's 
threatening statements to her is inadmissible under rule 4 03, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, because defendant failed to preserve the 
issue for appeal. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing the State to present evidence of defendant's threatening 
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statement to witness White, because the probative value of the 
statement outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice. 
The trial court did not err in allowing the State to 
call witness Smith, not named in a pretrial discovery witness 
list, where her name and role in the case were disclosed to the 
defense well in advance of trial and the State notified the 
defense of Smith's availability as soon as the State found out. 
Further, defendant was acquainted with Smith and had contacted 
her regarding the case prior to trial. Finally, the court 
allowed counsel adequate time to speak with Smith and to gather 
information about her prior to her testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TESTIMONY OF 
WITNESS TERESA CHRISTENSEN REGARDING 
DEFENDANT'S THREATENING STATEMENTS TO HER IS 
INADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 4 03, UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE, BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL 
This Court should not consider defendant's assertion 
that Teresa Christensen's testimony relating defendant's 
threatening statements to her is inadmissible under rule 4 03, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Defendant failed to either object to 
that evidence at trial or otherwise preserve the issue for 
appeal. 
It is well-settled that "in criminal cases in Utah 
. . . a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial 
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court record before an appellate court will review such claim on 
appeal." State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). The 
claim of error must be both "timely and specific." State v. 
Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1989) (refusing to address a 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct not raised at trial). 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the rationale for 
requiring the preservation of issues: "One of the primary 
reasons for imposing waiver rules ... is to assure that the trial 
court has the first opportunity to address a claim that it 
erred." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). See 
also State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982) (refusing to 
consider a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, which the Supreme 
Court regarded as meritorious, partly because the "trial court 
had no opportunity to rule on [the] matter and correct any of the 
alleged errors"). 
In the instant case, defendant did not object to Teresa 
Christensen's testimony. Defendant's brief claims that, "Over 
objection from defense counsel, (R 183-84), the court allowed 
Teresa Christensen to testify about a threat allegedly made by 
Hodges at a bar." Br. of App. at 11. This is not accurate. 
Defendant did not object to the testimony about the threat made 
at the bar (R. 203-05, Addendum B) .2 The citation in 
2Defendant filed a motion in limine three days prior to trial 
seeking "to suppress evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of 
defendant pursuant to the provisions of Rules 403 and 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1993)" (R. 36, Addendum C) , but that motion did 
not specify what testimony it sought to have suppressed. See State 
v. Schaffer, 725 P. 2d 1301, 1308 (Utah 1986) ("where a motion in 
limine does not adequately describe the evidence complained of, 
8 
defendant's brief to "R. 183-84" refers to an objection made to 
Mr. White's testimony, not to that of Ms. Christensen. See 
Addendum B. 
Having failed to make a "contemporaneous objection or 
some form of specific preservation" as "part of the trial court 
record," Tillman, 750 P.2d at 551, and having failed to show 
plain error, defendant is precluded from raising the issue on 
appeal. State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989). This Court should not address it. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE 
STATE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S 
THREATENING STATEMENT TO WITNESS WHITE 
Defendant's threatening statement to witness Kenneth 
White during a telephone call a few days after the burglary was 
highly probative to show a consciousness of guilt and was 
properly admitted into evidence. 
A. Standard of Review 
A trial court's decision to admit or suppress evidence 
under rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence, will be upheld on appeal 
unless it constitutes an "abuse of discretion," which has been 
defined by the Utah Supreme Court in this context to mean that 
the trial court's ruling extended "beyond the limits of 
reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 
. that motion does not provide the trial judge with an 
opportunity to make a ruling, and a contemporaneous objection is 
necessary"). The motion was also untimely under rule 12(b)(2), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (motions concerning admissibility 
of evidence shall be made at least five days before trial). 
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1992). See also State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 
1989); State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350, 353 (Utah 1985). Because 
the validity of this standard appeared to be in doubt for a 
period of time, it is important to trace that short detour in the 
law and the subsequent revitalization of this standard of review. 
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the 
supreme court characterized the standard of review for a rule 4 03 
balancing as one of correctness, but with some "de facto" 
recognition of discretion, reversing only if the trial court 
"acted unreasonably in striking the balance" between relevance 
and unfair prejudice to the accused. Id. at 781-82 n.3. This 
appeared to be a departure from the past. A partial explanation 
of the Ramirez language was added in State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256 (Utah 1993), where the supreme court stated that 
the most common standards of review, clear 
error for findings of fact, abuse of 
discretion or reasonability for rulings 
requiring a balancing of factors, and 
correctness for conclusions of law, can each 
be viewed as granting progressively less 
discretion to the trial judge and placing 
more responsibility on the appellate court. 
Id. at 1270 n.ll. In Hamilton, the supreme court again applied 
an "abuse of discretion" standard for rule 403. 827 P.2d at 239-
40. 
Most recently, in State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(Utah 1994), the supreme court expressly held that the proper 
standard for reviewing rule 403 decisions is abuse of discretion, 
but indicated that, under Utah law, "the term 'abuse of 
discretion' has no tight meaning." The court described the 
10 
existing standards of review as containing "many shades of 
variance" along the "spectrum of discretion." Id. at 5. The 
court then stated: 
At the extreme end of the discretion spectrum 
would be a decision by the trial court to 
grant or deny a new trial based on 
insufficiency of the evidence. . . . Also 
toward the broad end of the spectrum is the 
decision to admit or exclude evidence under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403. 
Id. at 6 (citations omitted). 
Thus, the standard of review for a rule 4 03 decision 
remains one of abuse of discretion, as noted above, and that 
term, as applied to rule 403, is defined to afford a great deal 
of discretion to the trial court. A rule 403 decision will 
therefore be reversed on appeal only if the trial court abused 
its discretion. State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295-96 (Utah 
App. 1990); State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah App. 
1989). 
B. Probative Value vs. Prejudicial Effect 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting evidence of the threat made by defendant to Kenneth 
White where the probative value of that evidence outweighed any 
potential for unfair prejudice. 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, states that " [a]11 
relevant evidence is admissible," unless otherwise precluded. 
Rule 4 04(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that evidence of 
"other crimes, wrongs or acts" may be admissible to prove 
"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
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identity, or absence of mistake or accident." The relevance of 
evidence of threats by an accused toward an adverse witness to 
demonstrate a consciousness of guilt is well-established. United 
States v. Gatto, 995 F.2d 449, 454 (3rd Cir.), cert, denied, 114 
S. Ct. 391 (1993); United States v. Gonsalves, 668 F.2d 73, 75 
(1st Cir.), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 909 (1982); State v. Baker, 
773 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Mont. 1989); State v. Hoaan, 748 S.W.2d 766, 
770-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); 2 Wigmore on Evidence § 278 
(Chadbourn rev. 1979). 
Rule 4 03 provides, in pertinent part, "Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has an "undue tendency to 
suggest decision on an improper basis [such as] an emotional 
one," State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989) (quoting M. 
Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 403.1, at 178 (2d ed. 
1986)), or if it "appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its 
sense of horror, [or] provokes its instinct to punish." Id. 
(quoting Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972-73 (3rd Cir. 1980)). 
In assessing the probative value of evidence, it is 
important to examine the proponent's "need" for the evidence. 
United States v. Guerrero, 803 F.2d 783, 786 (3rd Cir. 1986). 
This does not refer to the strength of the proponent's case, but 
rather to the "importance and centrality to the ultimate issue 
. . . of the fact sought to be proved by the threat evidence, and 
the availability of other evidence to establish the fact." Id.; 
12 
see also United States v. Rosa, 705 F.2d 1375, 1378 (1st Cir. 
1983); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988); 
Morrell. 803 P.2d at 296. 
In assessing the prejudicial nature of the evidence, 
elements which should be considered include: the "degree to 
which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility," Shickles, 760 P.2d at 296, "the nature or style of 
the specific witness's narrative, the likelihood that the 
testimony is true[,] and the sufficiency of the other evidence 
presented to make a reasonable connection between the defendant 
and the offense charged." Guerrero, 803 F.2d at 786 (citation 
omitted). 
In the instant case, the primary issue at trial was the 
identity of the burglar. At the time Kenneth White testified, 
the State's case was based on Ed Johnson's testimony that he 
"thought" defendant was the burglar, White's identification of 
defendant by her voice, body shape, and clothing, and defendant's 
confession to Teresa Christensen. Thus, the telephonic threat 
made to White over the phone was important corroboration of the 
identity of the burglar, which was the critical issue.3 
The probative value of defendant's threat to White was 
significant. This is particularly true in light of the context 
3Although Ruth Ann Smith's testimony was very helpful in 
solidifying the State's identification testimony, it cannot fairly 
be viewed as "other available evidence," since it had been ruled 
inadmissible (and was unavailable to the State) at the time the 
trial court ruled on the admissibility of the evidence of threats 
to White (R. 143). 
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of the statement. White testified that defendant called him on 
the phone just a few days after he had identified her to the 
police as the culprit and told him, "You're dead, you're dead" 
(R. 180, 186, Addendum B). It is notable that defendant did not 
tell White, as an innocent but concerned accused may have, "You 
have made a terrible mistake. It wasn't me you saw. You have 
the wrong person." The very strong implication of the statement 
defendant did make is that White had correctly identified her and 
that she was displeased at having been turned in. 
The probative value of this threat becomes even greater 
when viewed in conjunction with the similar threat made to 
Christensen. In that instance, defendant flatly told Christensen 
she would be killed if she testified against defendant (R. 204). 
At that point the jury was able to see the pattern developing: 
defendant trying to escape conviction through suppression of the 
truth by intimidation. This pattern became even more apparent 
when Smith testified that defendant had also pressured her to not 
testify truthfully (R. 256-57). 
Turning to the second prong of the assessment, the 
prejudicial nature of the conduct, it does not appear likely that 
the threat made to White caused the jury to decide this case on 
an emotional basis, out of a sense of horror or instinct to 
punish, or because of some overmastering hostility. 
The style of White's narrative in describing the threat 
did not appear to be designed or likely to provoke great horror 
or sympathy, and there is no indication that he exhibited signs 
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of trembling fear of defendant due to the threat (180, 186, 
Addendum B). Nor did the prosecutor comment on White's testimony 
on that subject at all during closing argument (R. 300-05, 313-
17), let alone try to emotionally capitalize on it. Furthermore, 
the threat was made soon after the burglary in June, and there 
was no indication to the jury that there had been any attempt to 
carry it out in the five intervening months. All of these 
factors contribute to the likelihood that the jury used the 
information as intended--to show defendant's guilty conscience--
and not to portray her as a bad or dangerous person who ought to 
be convicted whether she committed the crime or not. 
The testimony of defendant's threat appears to have 
been presented as a reasonable segment of corroborative 
identification evidence in a case where identification was the 
key issue, and not as a useless but inflammatory tidbit 
"of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels 
for the sake of its prejudicial effect." Bartley, 784 P.2d at 
1237 (quoting Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984, in turn quoting United 
States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 
U.S. 862 (1979)). 
While evidence of threats to a witness has a potential 
for prejudice, United States v. Gonzalez. 703 F.2d 1222, 1223 
(11th Cir. 1983), Gonsalves, 668 F.2d at 75, it is not one of 
those categories recognized by the Utah Supreme Court as having 
an unusual propensity to do so. State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525, 
527 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (1990). The 
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admission of the threat evidence under the circumstances of this 
case is consistent with the holdings of other courts. E.g.. 
Guerrero, 803 F.2d at 785-87 (defendant's encouragement to 
witness not to testify and remark that he knew where witness' 
family lived properly admitted under federal rule 4 03 analysis); 
United States v. Rosa, 705 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(defendant's threat to kill witness if he testified for 
government properly admitted to show consciousness of guilt under 
rule 403 analysis); Gonzalez, 703 F.2d at 1223-24 (defendant's 
statement to witness over phone, repeating "you will soon die," 
admissible to show consciousness of guilt under rule 4 03 
analysis); Gonsalves, 668 F.2d at 74, 76 (defendant's statement 
to third party, stating that the witness "is dead," admissible to 
show consciousness of guilt under rule 4 03 analysis); Anderson v. 
State. 574 So. 2d 87, 93 (Fla.) (defendant's threats to witness 
and statement to third party that witness was "dead" admissible), 
cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 114 (1991); State v. Baker, 773 P.2d 
1194, 1199 (Mont. 1989) (defendant's letter to witness suggesting 
the possibility of getting "amnesia" admissible to show 
consciousness of guilt); State v. Hoaan, 748 S.W.2d 766, 770-71 
(Mo. App. 1988) (defendant's phone call suggesting witness not 
testify admissible to show consciousness of guilt, prejudicial 
and inflammatory nature of the evidence outweighed by probative 
value). 
The cases relied upon by defendant are easily 
distinguishable. The sole issue at trial in State v. Maurer, 770 
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P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), was defendant's state of mind when he 
killed the victim. The supreme court said of defendant's 
taunting letter written after the fact to the victim's father, 
11
 It would be difficult to draft a letter which would be more 
repulsive to the notion of the value of human life than was this 
letter." Id. at 983. The letter's probative value was found to 
be minimal because it dealt mainly with defendant's state of mind 
at the time of the writing, not at the time of the death. Id. 
The highly inflammatory nature of the letter, together with the 
prosecutor's emphasis on its disgusting nature in his remarks to 
the jury, were found likely to have provoked an emotional 
response or an instinct to punish in the jury. Id. at 983, 987. 
The inflammatory potential of defendant's conduct in 
the present case simply does not compare to that of Maurer's 
letter. Nor did the prosecutor emphasize or dwell on defendant's 
threatening conduct, as in Maurer. Most importantly, while 
Maurer's letter did not shed much light on his mental state at 
the time of the killing, the purpose for which it was purportedly 
offered, defendant's threat to White was directly probative in 
helping identify her as the burglar. While conduct evidencing a 
general consciousness of guilt may be of very limited use where 
mental state is the sole issue, such as in Maurer, it can be very 
probative where the question is one of complete innocence or 
guilt, as in the case at bar. 
State v. Marlar, 498 P.2d 1276 (Idaho 1972), also cited 
by defendant, provides an even clearer example of an attempt to 
17 
introduce evidence not offered to prove a material issue in the 
case. There, the identity of Marlar as the actor was not in 
issue, nor did his telephonic statement to the victim, "I'll put 
you in the morgue," give a clue as to his state of mind at the 
time of the offense. 
The Idaho Supreme Court did indicate adherence to the 
general rule, cited above, that "evidence is relevant which tends 
to show that the accused has either attempted to fabricate or 
procure false evidence or to suppress incriminating evidence," 
but found that Marlar's phone call simply did not address a 
probative issue so as to justify its admission. Id. at 1283. 
The same cannot be said of the case at bar. Here, 
defendant's phone call was not offered as "an opprobrious remark 
illustrating the caller's malevolent attitude toward the 
witness," id., but to show defendant's consciousness of guilt, 
indicating implicit acknowledgement of involvement in the 
offense. 
Although the trial court's findings were not ideally 
explicit, it did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
defendant's telephonic threat was not an "unrelated act," but 
rather did indeed "go to the facts of this case" and was 
therefore admissible (R. 184).4 
4Even if admission of White's testimony of the threat were an 
abuse of discretion, the error would be harmless and reversal would 
not be appropriate. State v. Hamilton, 827 P. 2d 232, 240 (Utah 
1992). Because that testimony was not emphasized by the State, 
State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Utah 1987), because the jury 
heard testimony of defendant's attempts to intimidate or influence 
two other witnesses (Christensen and Smith) anyway, and because of 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE 
STATE TO CALL A WITNESS NOT NAMED IN A 
PRETRIAL DISCOVERY WITNESS LIST, WHERE THE 
WITNESS' NAME AND ROLE IN THE CASE HAD BEEN 
DISCLOSED TO THE DEFENSE WELL IN ADVANCE OF 
TRIAL 
The trial court did not err, under the circumstances of 
this case, in allowing the State to call Ruth Ann Smith as a 
witness, although her name was not included in a pretrial witness 
list disclosed in response to a request for discovery. The Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the prosecutor's duties when voluntarily 
responding to a discovery request: (1) either "produce all the 
requested material or identify those portions not disclosed," and 
(2) provide, on an ongoing basis, "newly acquired information so 
as to avoid misleading the defense." State v. Kallin, 241 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 6, 9 (Utah 1994); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916-17 
(Utah 1987). 
In the instant case, the prosecutor complied with both 
requirements. She provided defense counsel with a police report 
containing Smith's name and role in the case well in advance of 
trial and notified the defense of Smith's availability as soon as 
she found out that Smith had come forward.5 
the abundance of other, uncontroverted evidence against defendant, 
"there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings." State v. Verde. 770 P. 2d 116, 120 
(Utah 1989). 
5Because Smith testified she had been subpoenaed (R. 256, 
261) , defendant attempts, in his brief, to conclude that the State 
subpoenaed her in advance of her voluntary appearance, and that she 
in fact appeared pursuant to a subpoena and not of her own 
volition. Br. of App. at 4-5, 15. However, this conclusion is not 
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Defendant's reliance on Knight is misdirected. In 
Knight, the State had failed, albeit inadvertently, to provide 
the defense with information in the State's possession, and the 
State had additionally failed to update the defense as to newly 
discovered information. The harm caused by the State's conduct 
was that, in failing to pass on information in its possession to 
the defense, the State misled the defense into believing that the 
information did not exist. 
In the instant case, no misleading occurred. Defendant 
had all of the information possessed by the State. Through the 
police report, defendant had been provided with Smith's full name 
as well as the nature and potential importance of her testimony. 
Defendant even spoke with Smith three weeks before trial. 
Defendant was told immediately after the prosecutor discovered 
that Smith had come forward for trial. The State complied fully 
with the discovery rules. 
Even if this Court were to find a violation of the 
discovery rules, the trial court took adequate measures to remedy 
the situation and eliminate any harm to defendant. 
The standard for reviewing a trial court's efforts to 
"obviate any prejudice resulting from a breach of the criminal 
discovery rules" is one of abuse of discretion. Knight, 734 P.2d 
at 918. In order to establish an abuse of discretion, a 
defendant must show that, even taking into account the remedial 
supported by the record, and is controverted by the prosecutor's 
representations to the court and by the witness' other testimony 
(R. 136, 239-40, 257-58). 
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measures ordered by the trial court, "absent the prosecutor's 
errors, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for defendant," id. at 923, and that "remedial measures 
requested [by the defense] but refused would have obviated this 
prejudice." Id. at 918. Furthermore, the trial court is not 
required to grant the specific remedy requested by the defense, 
but may instead choose other available, less harsh remedies. 
State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990). 
In the case at bar, defendant cannot make the required 
showing. Defendant initially requested one of three remedies 
from the trial court: dismissal; remand for a new preliminary 
hearing; or preclusion of Smith from testifying (R. 140-43, 239). 
After those remedies were not applied, defendant then requested a 
forty-eight-hour continuance, stating that this was the amount of 
time needed to obtain Smith's criminal history (R. 245-46). 
The remedy adopted by the trial court was two-fold: 
(1) defense counsel was given an opportunity to speak with Smith, 
of which opportunity defense counsel did not avail himself (R. 
244, 246-48, 259), and (2) a seventeen-hour continuance was 
granted (from 5:00 p.m. until 10:00 the next morning), which 
proved to be adequate to obtain and use Smith's criminal history 
for impeachment purposes (R. 276-79, Exhibits 3-D and 4-D, 
Addendum D). 
Defendant has failed to show that the trial court's 
remedial action was deficient. Because defense counsel chose not 
to speak with Smith prior to her testimony when given an 
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opportunity to do so and because defendant was able to obtain 
Smith's criminal history and impeach her with it, defendant is 
hard-pressed to show how more advance notice or additional time 
would have helped any legitimate defense efforts. See Kallin, 
241 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9 (prosecution has a duty to make complete 
disclosure, but defense counsel also has an affirmative duty to 
make a reasonable investigation); Christofferson. 793 P.2d at 948 
("defendant's failure to mitigate the impact of the unexpected 
testimony" precludes his claim of error). This is particularly 
true given that defendant had actually contacted Smith regarding 
the case three weeks prior to trial (R. 256-57). 
In sum, because there was neither a discovery violation 
nor an inadequate remedy for the inconvenience caused by Smith's 
delayed availability to testify, defendant's argument on this 
point cannot prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant failed to preserve any objection to the 
testimony of Teresa Christensen regarding defendant's threats and 
this Court should refuse to consider that issue on appeal. 
Kenneth White's testimony of defendant's threat toward him was 
properly admitted, and the trial court's admission of that 
testimony did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The trial 
court did not err in allowing Ruth Ann Smith to testify and took 
appropriate measures to mitigate potential prejudice to 
defendant. If any error occurred, it was harmless. 
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Accordingly, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions for burglary and theft. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this X& day of July, 1994 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
&< MARK ANDRUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the 
second degree. 
76-6-404. Theft - Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
76-6-412. Theft - Classification of offenses - Action for treble 
damages against receiver of stolen property. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter 
shall be punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor 
vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of 
the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but 
not more than $1,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any 
robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, 
cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, 
swine, or poultry; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property 
stolen was more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property 
stolen was $100 or less. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of 
Subsection 76-6-408(1) may bring an action against any person 
mentioned in Subsection 76-6-408(2)(d) for three times the amount 
of actual damages, if any sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit 
and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant 
evidence inadmissible• 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided 
by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the 
state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant 
is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time* 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; 
exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's 
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose 
of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by 
the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait 
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a 
homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a 
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
ADDENDUM B 
Q ALL RIGHT. AND DO YOU RECALL TESTIFYING AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING? 
A YES. 
Q DO YOU RECALL BEING ASKED AT THE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING ON JUNE, EXCUSE ME, JULY 13TH OF THIS YEAR IF YOU 
RECOGNIZED THE PERSON THAT YOU SAW FIGHTING OUT IN THE 
HALL WITH PETE? 
A YES. 
Q AND AT THAT TIME DID YOU IDENTIFY SOMEONE AS 
BEING A PERSON YOU SAW OUT IN THE HALL? 
A YES. 
Q AND WHO WAS IT YOU IDENTIFIED AT THAT TIME? 
A DEBRA HODGES. 
Q AFTER YOU HAD TALKED TO THE POLICE DID YOU HAVE 
ANY CONTACT WITH DEBRA HODGES AFTER THAT? 
A JUST A COUPLE--NO. JUST A COUPLE THREATENING 
CALLS I'D GOTTEN AND MEETING HER HUSBAND AND COMING IN THE 
FRONT ENTRANCE OF THE APARTMENT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. DRAWING YOUR ATTENTION TO THE TIME 
IMMEDIATELY AFTER--
MR. SCOWCROFT: YOUR HONOR, I OBJECT TO THIS ON 
FOUNDATIONAL GROUNDS. AND I THINK, PERHAPS, I NEED THE 
BENEFIT OF THE RECORD TO MAKE THIS OBJECTION SO I'D ASK 
THE COURT TO--
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, RESERVE YOUR OBJECTION. 
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IT'S OVERRULED FOR NOW. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: WELL, YOUR HONOR, THE POINT IS I 
THINK THE OBJECTION OUGHT TO BE MADE PRIOR TO THE STATE'S 
ATTEMPT TO ELICIT THIS KIND OF TESTIMONY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. WE WILL EXCUSE THE 
JURY FOR A MOMENT AND PROVIDE YOU THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE 
YOUR OBJECTION. 
(WHEREUPON, THE JURY LEAVES THE COURTROOM). 
JUDGE YOUNG: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT WE'RE 
CONVENED OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. YOU HAVE TWO 
MATTERS OF LAW THAT YOU DESIRE TO DEAL WITH, MR. 
SCOWCROFT. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: I DO, YOUR HONOR. FIRST OF ALL, 
DURING THE TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHNSON I ATTEMPTED TO USE A 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING HELD IN THIS CASE 
THAT WAS PREPARED BY MY OFFICE. THE COURT WOULD NOT ALLOW 
ME TO DO THAT. I BELIEVE THAT I AM ALLOWED TO DO THAT 
UNDER RULES 612 AND 613 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
THE TRANSCRIPT IS A RELIABLE TRANSCRIPTION OF A HEARING 
CONDUCTED UNDER OATH. THERE'S ABSOLUTELY NO BASIS FOR THE 
STATE TO ARGUE THAT IT IS NOT A RELIABLE TRANSCRIPTION. 
AND FOR THAT .REASON I SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO UTILIZE THAT IN 
ORDER TO IMPEACH THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES ON THE BASIS 
OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY. 
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1 JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, THE COURT WAS INFORMED THAT 
2 THE STATEMENT THAT WAS PREPARED WAS PREPARED BY YOUR 
3 SECRETARY. IT WAS NOT PREPARED BY A COURT REPORTER AND 
4 THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE STATEMENT WAS EVER VERIFIED 
5 AS ACCURATE BY THE STATE'S ATTORNEY. IF YOU WANT TO USE 
6 THOSE I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR USING A TRANSCRIPT TO 
7 IMPEACH A WITNESS'S TESTIMONY ON THE BASIS OF ITS VERIFI-
6 CATION, BUT WHEN I WAS APPROACHED AT THE SIDEBAR YOU WERE 
g ASKED THE QUESTION AS TO WHERE YOU GOT THAT, IT WAS INDI-
10 CATED IT WAS PREPARED BY YOUR SECRETARY, THERE WAS NO 
•I-I VERIFICATION AS TO ITS AUTHENTICITY OR ACCURACY. WE 
12 HAVEN'T YOUR SECRETARY AVAILABLE NOR HAS THE STATE'S 
13 ATTORNEY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO READ IT. 
14 I WILL FURTHER COMMENT, HOWEVER, THAT I FEEL 
15 THAT YOU GOT THE ADVANTAGE OF THAT RECORD IN TERMS OF THE 
16 CROSS-EXAMINATION WHEN YOU REFERRED TO IT AS TO WHETHER HE 
17 RECOLLECTED ACCURATELY HIS PRIOR TESTIMONY. SO I HAD TO 
18 SUSTAIN THE OBJECTION. IF YOU HAVEN'T VERIFIED THE VALID-
19 ITY OF A TRANSCRIPT SO THAT IT CAN BE USED I CAN'T RELY ON 
20 IT-
21 MR. SCOWCROFT: WELL THEN, I WOULD ASK THE COURT 
22 TO GIVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY EITHER, NO. 1, TO BRING THE 
23 PERSON IN WHO PREPARED THIS TO TESTIFY TO ITS VALIDITY OR 
24 TO GIVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADJOURN THESE PROCEEDINGS, 
25 GIVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET A DOCUMENT THAT THE STATE'S 
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NOT GOING TO OBJECT TO. 
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. THAT REQUEST IS DENIED. 
ALL RIGHT. YOUR OTHER MATTER? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: YOUR HONOR, WE FILED A MOTION 
PRIOR TO THIS TRIAL TO PREVENT THE ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY 
REGARDING THESE TELEPHONE CALLS THAT WERE SUPPOSEDLY MADE. 
MY OBJECTION TO THESE IS TWOFOLD. THEY ARE UNRELIABLE 
BECAUSE THEY ARE--THERE IS NO FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT THEIR 
ADMISSION. 
NO. 2 THEY CONSTITUTE SEPARATE ACTS AND THE 
ADMISSION UNDER 403 AND 404 AND TESTIMONY REGARDING 
SEPARATE WRONGS, WRONGFUL CONDUCT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL NOW, WHAT'S WRONG ABOUT A 
TELEPHONE CALL? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: THE WITNESS TESTIFIED THAT HE 
WAS THREATENED. WITHOUT FOUNDATION. AND BY MS. HODGES. 
AND THAT'S WHAT MY OBJECTIONS GO TO. THEY ARE TWOFOLD AND 
I HAVE EXPLAINED THAT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, I DON'T HAVE ANY FURTHER 
BASIS TO KNOW WHAT THE TELEPHONE CALLS WERE OR WHAT THE 
WITNESS WAS GOING TO TESTIFY TO. YOUR MOTION IN LIMINE 
SAID TO SUPPRESS OTHER CRIMES, WHICH I WAS PERFECTLY 
WILLING TO DO, WRONGS OR ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO 
THE PROVISIONS OF 403 AND 404. I WOULD ASSUME THOSE TO BE 
COMPLETELY UNRELATED ACTS TO THIS OFFENSE. IF THE DEFEN-
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DANT MAKES THREATENING PHONE CALLS IN RELATION TO ONE OF 
THE WITNESSES THAT'S TESTIFYING IN THIS CASE, THAT IS IN 
RELATION TO THIS OFFENSE. 
WHAT I'M THINKING OF IN YOUR MOTION IN LIMINE, 
I'M THINKING OF AN UNRELATED ACT LIKE, PERHAPS, A FORGERY 
IN SOME OTHER YEAR OR SOME OTHER KIND OF ACT, BUT ANYTHING 
THAT'S RELATED TO THIS OFFENSE, THREATENING PHONE CALLS, 
IF SHE MADE THEM, WOULD 30 TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND 
WOULD BE MEASURED AND JUDGED BY THE JURY AS TO THEIR 
WEIGHT AND THEIR RELIABILITY BY THE JURY DETERMINING 
WHETHER TO BELIEVE THE WITNESS. THAT INVADES EXACTLY THE 
PREROGATIVE THAT I THINK IS PRESERVED FOR THE JURY. ALL 
RIGHT? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: OKAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: NOTHING FURTHER. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. MS. BYRNE, DO YOU 
DESIRE THE RECORD FOR ANYTHING IN TERMS OF ARGUMENT ON 
THESE TWO ISSUES? 
MS. BYRNE: WELL, YOUR HONOR, AGAIN THE 403 AND 
404 MOTION, THIS IS, AS I POINTED OUT EARLIER TO THE 
COURT, IS THE PROBLEM, WE DO NOT HAVE SPECIFICITY. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: WE DID PUT IT ON THE RECORD 
.PHONE CALLS WOULD BE OBJECTED TO. SO IN TERMS OF THAT I 
DON'T THINK--
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MS. BYRNE: I THINK IT WAS MY TURN, COUNSEL. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IT'S HER TURN. 
MS. BYRNE: THANK YOU. THAT WAS OUR OBJECTION 
TO THE LACK OF SPECIFICITY INITIALLY IN THE MOTION. THERE 
IS CERTAINLY CASE LAW INDICATING MR. LYNN BROWN ATTEMPTED 
TO USE A TRANSCRIPT ONCE PREPARED BY HIS OFFICE FOR PUR-
POSES OF IMPEACHING THE WITNESS. IT WAS NOT ALLOWED AT 
THAT TIME. THAT WAS TAKEN TO THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
RULING WAS THE SAME AS THE COURT'S IN THIS INSTANCE, THAT 
IT WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED BECAUSE IT'S NOT PREPARED BY AN 
IMPARTIAL PARTY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, ALL RIGHT. THE WITNESS CAN 
RESUME THE STAND AND WE'LL RECALL THE JURY. 
(WHEREUPON, THE JURY RETURNS TO THE COURTROOM). 
MR. SCOWCROFT: YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD THEN INVOKE 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
MS. BYRNE: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO 
THESE PEOPLE TO SEE IF THEY ARE WITNESSES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, NO ONE'S INVOKED THE EXCLUS-
IONARY RULE. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: I WILL INVOKE THE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THE RECORD MAY SHOW WE 
ARE RECONVENED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. 
YOU MAY CONTINUE YOUR DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
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MS. BYRNE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (CONTINUED) 
BY MS. BYRNE: 
Q ALL RIGHT. I BELIEVE YOU JUST INDICATED YOU HAD 
RECEIVED A PHONE CALL SUBSEQUENT TO THE EVENTS THAT WE'VE 
BEEN TALKING ABOUT THAT OCCURRED AT PETE JOHNSON'S APART-
MENT. HOW LONG AFTER JUNE 3RD DID YOU RECEIVE THESE PHONE 
CALLS? 
A OH, IT WAS ABOUT POUR OR FIVE DAYS AFTERWARDS. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AND DID THE PERSON WHO CALLED YOU 
IDENTIFY THEMSELVES? 
A NO. 
Q ALL RIGHT. DID YOU RECOGNIZE THE VOICE THAT YOU 
HEARD ON THE PHONE? 
A YES. 
Q HOW DID YOU RECOGNIZE THAT VOICE? 
A JUST BY HER SAYING YOU'RE DEAD, YOU'RE DEAD, AND 
BEING AROUND THIS PERSON AS MUCH AS I WAS I KNEW THEIR 
VOICE. I JUST KNEW IT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. IS THERE ANY REASON KNOWN TO YOU WHY 
MRS. HODGES WOULD CALL YOU AND SAY TO YOU "YOU'RE DEAD, 
YOU'RE DEAD"? 
A I DON'T KNOW WHY. 
Q OKAY. NOW MR. WHITE, DO YOU HAVE WHAT'S 
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TERESA CHRISTENSEN. 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE STATE, HAVING 
BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
THE CLERK: PLEASE BE SEATED AND STATE YOUR NAME 
AND SPELL IT. 
THE WITNESS: MY NAME'S TERESA CHRISTENSEN. 
TERESA'S T-E-R-E-S-A AND CHRISTENSEN IS C-H-R-I-S-T-E-N-S-
E-N. 
PIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. BYRNE: 
Q MS. CHRISTENSEN, AROUND JUNE 3RD OF 1993 WERE 
YOU LIVING IN THE APARTMENT BUILDING AT 7 EAST 400 SOUTH? 
A YES, I WAS. 
Q HOW LONG HAD YOU LIVED THERE AT THAT TIME? 
A I'D BEEN LIVING THERE, I'M TRYING TO FIGURE OUT, 
ABOUT SIX MONTHS. 
Q AND ARE YOU ACQUAINTED WITH DEBRA HODGES? 
A YES, I AM. 
Q AND DURING THE TIME BEFORE JUNE 3RD, THE SIX 
MONTHS WHEN YOU'D BEEN LIVING THERE, HAD YOU HAD ANY 
DEALINGS WITH DEBRA HODGES, JUST TALKING TO HER? 
A YES. 
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Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, ON, LET'S SEE, THE EARLY 
MORNING HOURS OF JUNE 3RD, WERE YOU IN YOUR APARTMENT AT 
THAT TIME? 
A YES, I WAS. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AND YOU DIDN'T SEE ANY OF THE EVENTS 
COMPLAINED OF AT THAT TIME, DID YOU? 
A NO, I DID NOT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AFTER JUNE 3RD DID YOU HAVE A 
CONVERSATION WITH DEBRA HODGES? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q WOULD YOU DESCRIBE FOR THE JURY WHERE THAT 
CONVERSATION WITH DEBRA TOOK PLACE? 
A IT TOOK PLACE IN THE APARTMENT BUILDING. 
Q OKAY. AND DO YOU RECALL ABOUT HOW LONG AFTER 
JUNE 3RD OR IF IT WAS JUNE 3RD OR HOW LONG AFTER THAT 
CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE? 
A ABOUT A DAY OR SO, ABOUT A DAY OR TWO AFTER. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AND WHO WAS PRESENT WHEN THIS 
CONVERSATION WITH DEBRA OCCURRED? 
A THERE WAS--I'M TRYING TO THINK. HER HUSBAND WAS 
THERE, DEBRA WAS THERE, AND DEBRA'S BROTHER-IN-LAW WAS 
THERE. 
Q OKAY. WHAT IS DEBRA'S HUSBAND'S NAME, IF YOU 
KNOW? 
A TROY. 
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Q WHAT IS HER BROTHER-IN-LAW'S NAME, IF YOU KNOW? 
A CALVIN. 
Q WHAT DID DEBRA HODGES SAY AT THAT TIME RELATIVE 
TO THE EVENTS IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JUNE 3RD? 
A SHE JUST SAID THAT SHE HAD BROKEN INTO PETE'S 
APARTMENT AND HAD GOTTEN INTO A CONFRONTATION WITH HIM AND 
HAD TAKEN HIS WALLET AND TAKEN THE MONEY OUT AND HAD A 
LITTLE ARGUMENT WITH HIM AND A LITTLE FIGHT WITH HIM. 
Q WHAT SEEMED TO BE THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF HER 
AND THE OTHER PEOPLE IN THE APARTMENT WHILE SHE WAS 
TELLING YOU THIS? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: YOUR HONOR, OBJECTION. I DON'T 
THINK THAT IS RELEVANT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: JUST A MOMENT. I DO HAVE SOME 
CONCERNS ABOUT THAT AS TO THE PERCEPTION AND THE ATTITUDE 
SO THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED. 
MS. BYRNE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
Q (BY MS. BYRNE) HOW LONG DID THIS CONVERSATION 
GO ON? 
A GOLL, OH MAYBE ABOUT A HALF HOUR. NOT REAL 
LONG. 
Q WERE ANY OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED BESIDES--
A THAT WAS REALLY ABOUT IT. JUST WHAT WAS GOING 
ON, BUT THAT WAS--NOTHING IN PARTICULAR. 
Q AFTER THAT CONVERSATION OCCURRED DID YOU HAVE 
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ANY OTHER CONTACT WITH DEBRA HODGES WHERE ANYTHING RELA-
TIVE TO THE EVENT ON JUNE 3RD WERE DISCUSSED? 
A I'M TRYING TO THINK IF I DID WITH HER. GOLL, 
THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A FEW BUT I CAN'T REMEMBER RIGHT OFF. 
Q OKAY. DID YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER CONVERSATIONS 
WITH HER AFTER THIS CONVERSATION IN THE APARTMENT? 
A YES, I DID. ABOUT--
Q JUST A SECOND. 
JUDGE YOUNG: JUST LISTEN TO HER QUESTION. AND 
HER QUESTION WAS, DID YOU HAVE CONVERSATIONS. IF YOU JUST 
ANSWER THAT YES, AS YOU DID, THEN LET HER ASK HER NEXT 
QUESTION. 
THE WITNESS: OKAY. I'M SORRY. 
MS. BYRNE: THAT'S ALL RIGHT. 
Q (BY MS. BYRNE) OKAY. DO YOU RECALL HOW LONG 
AFTER JUNE 3RD IT WAS THAT YOU HAD A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSA-
TION WITH DEBRA? 
A IT'S PROBABLY, GOLL, ABOUT MAYBE A WEEK OR TWO. 
IT WAS A WEEKEND, A FRIDAY NIGHT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AND DO YOU RECALL WHERE THAT CONVER-
SATION TOOK PLACE? 
A THE NOGALES BAR. 
Q HOW DID YOU HAPPEN TO BE IN THE NOGALES BAR? 
A I WAS IN THERE WITH A FRIEND. SHE WAS HAVING A 
COUPLE OF DRINKS. DANCING. 
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Q WHAT WERE YOU DRINKING? 
A I HAD A COUPLE OF BEERS. GLASSES OF BEER. 
Q WHAT TIME DID YOU GET THERE, IF YOU RECALL? 
A IT WAS PROBABLY ABOUT 9:00 O'CLOCK. AROUND 
ABOUT 9:00 OR 10:00. 
Q WHAT TIME DID YOU LEAVE, IF YOU RECALL? 
A I LEFT PROBABLY ABOUT 1:00. THAT'S WHEN I 
USUALLY LEAVE. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AND HOW DID THIS CONVERSATION WITH 
DEBRA HODGES OCCUR? 
A I'D BEEN SITTING THERE AND THEN MY FRIENDS LEFT 
AND THEN WHEN SHE NOTICED--SHE HAD BEEN WATCHING ME ALL 
NIGHT, KIND OF GIVING ME, YOU KNOW, WE HAD LOOKS, AND THEN 
AFTER ALL MY FRIENDS LEFT SHE CAME OVER TO THE TABLE AND 
SHE SAID THAT IF I WERE TO TESTIFY AGAINST HER SHE KNEW OF 
SOME MAN, SOMEBODY THAT WOULD COME AND I WOULD BE DEAD. I 
WOULD BE KILLED. IF I TESTIFIED AGAINST HER. 
Q AND DID YOU MAKE ANY RESPONSE TO THAT? 
A I WAS--NOT REALLY. 
Q DID YOU SAY ANYTHING BACK TO HER? 
A I'M TRYING TO THINK IF I DID OR NOT. UHM, JUST 
SAID, WELL, I DON'T CARE, YOU KNOW, I'M STILL GOING TO, IF 
THEY WANT ME I STILL WILL TESTIFY. 
Q DID SHE MAKE ANY OTHER STATEMENT OR DID SHE--
A NOT THAT I CAN REMEMBER. THEN SHE JUST WALKED 
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AWAY. SAYS, YOU'RE DEAD, AND WALKED AWAY. 
Q OKAY. NOW, DO YOU HAVE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
FROM WHICH YOU TAKE--JUST A SEC--FOR WHICH YOU TAKE 
MEDICATION? 
A YES, I DO. I AM SUFFERING FROM CHRONIC 
DEPRESSION. 
JUDGE YOUNG: MA'AM, IT'S OKAY TO GIVE THE 
ANSWER BUT HER QUESTION W*S ONLY, DO YOU HAVE THEM, THE 
ANSWER IS, YES. 
THE WITNESS: I'M SORRY. YES, I DO. 
Q (BY MS. BYRNE) WHAT SORT OF PROBLEMS DO YOU 
HAVE FOR WHICH YOU TAKE MEDICATION? 
A I'M SUFFERING FROM CHRONIC DEPRESSION. 
Q OKAY. DOES CHRONIC DEPRESSION INTERFERE WITH 
YOUR ABILITY TO PERCEIVE WHAT GOES ON AROUND YOU? 
A NO. 
Q ALL RIGHT. DOES HAVING A COUPLE OF BEERS ALONG 
WITH THE MEDICATION INTERFERE? DOES ONE INTERFERE WITH 
THE OTHER? 
A NO, NOT WITH ME, NO. 
MS. BYRNE: I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS OF THIS 
WITNESS AT THIS TIME. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. CROSS-EXAMINATION? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
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ADDENDUM C 
. / 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, (#5141) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEBRA HODGES, 
Defendant. 
MOTION IN LIMINE TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS 
OR ACTS 
Case No. 931901046FS 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
The defendant, DEBRA HODGES, respectfully moves this court to 
suppress evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of defendant 
pursuant to the provisions of Rules 403 and 404 (b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1993). 
DATED this / Q day of November, 1993. 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the 
County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this day of November, 1993. 
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STATE QF UTAH 
OTN 502552 
CAO #92-3-05481 
BOOKED IN JAIL ON: September 30, 1991 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Before: {Z£%y' 
Magistrate 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
* WARRANT OF ARREST 
RUTH A. SMITH DOB 5-30-54, * 
* Criminal No. 
:
 9210'^"?? FS 
THE STATE OF UTAH: 
To any Peace Officer in the State of Utah, Greetings: 
An Information, upon oath,: having been this day made before 
me by Sgt. B. Shober - West Jordan Police Department, Case No. 
91-7196, and it appears from the Information or Affidavit filed 
with the Information, that there is probable cause to believe that 
the public offense(s) of: 
Two counts POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, each a 
Third Degree Felony; and POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, has been committed, and that RUTH A. 
SMITH has committed it. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to arrest the above-named 
defendant forthwith and bring the defendant before this Court, or 
before the nearest or most accessible magistrate for setting 
bail. If the defendant has fled justice, you shall pursue the 
defendant into any other county of this state and there arrest the 
defendant. The Court finds reasonable grounds to believe 
defendant will not appear upon a summons. 
Bail is set in the amount of $3,000. 
Dated this l^ day of October, A.D. 1992. 
